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Abstract:  We introduce simple production economic models to estimate the potential 
gains from mergers. We decompose the gains into technical efficiency, size (scale) and 
harmony ( mix) gains, and we discuss alternative ways to capture these gains. We 
propose to approximate the production processes using the non-parametric Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach, and we use the resulting operational approach 
to estimate the potential gains from merging agricultural extension offices in Denmark. 
  
Contents:  1. Introduction,  2. Literature, 3. Production Models, 4. Measures of 
Merger Gains, 5. Decomposing Merger Gains, 6. Alternative Decompositions, 7. The 
Danish Agricultural Extension Services, 8. Final Remarks, References. 
 





There are frequent reports of mergers and takeovers in the business press. It seems 
that mergers play an important role in the restructuring of many sectors. There is also 
a considerable theoretical literature on the pros and cons of mergers, and a number of 
studies trying to evaluate the effects of actual mergers ex post. 
 
There are many reasons for merging. The internal or organizational reasons include 





scarce managerial skills, etc. The external or market oriented reasons include the 
possibility of gaining market power via size or scope or the facilitation of collusive 
behavior. There are also many obstacles to mergers, including the possible conflicts 
between different business cultures and public policies directed against the exercise of 
market power. 
 
The aim of this paper is to focus on the potential production economic effects of 
mergers  and in particular to discuss ways of quantifying these. We deviate from 
previous papers by estimating the potential gains a priori rather than the realized gains 
ex post. We deviate also by using a multiple inputs multiple outputs production model , 
as opposed to a more aggregate cost model. Lastly, we deviate by developing a 
framework where the potential gains can be decomposed and related to different 
strategic possibilities, viz. improvement of efficiency in individual firms, exchange of 
inputs and outputs via inter-firm markets, and genuine full scale merger. 
 
We model the multiple inputs multiple outputs production process using an activity 
analysis or so-called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach. This approach is 
easy to use and it has proved to b e a flexible and powerful tool in a large number of 
empirical studies. A particular advantage is that it does not require prices on inputs or 
outputs. Our specific methodological contribution is to show how the effects of 
mergers can be captured and decomposed by DEA models. 
 
In the application, we use our approach to evaluate the potential gains from mergers of 
agricultural extension offices in Denmark. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we relate our approach to some 
existing literature. In Section 3, we introduce a class of production models and we 
review how they can be estimated using DEA. In Section 4, we p ropose aggregate 
measures of the potential gains from a merger, and in Section 5, we discuss how these 
measures can be decomposed into technical efficiency, size and harmony effects. 
Some alternative decompositions and the pros and cons of our proposed 
decomposition are discussed in Section 6. The application is discussed in Section 7, 





The general economic literature emphasizes how mergers may affect costs and 
competition, cf. e.g. Perry and Porter(85) and Farrell and Shapiro(90). A recent issue 
is the strategic value of an early merger, cf. Nilssen and Sørgaard(1998). 
  
The production economic effects of mergers are related to the cost aspect. This 
includes the technical efficiency of production, the (dis) economies of scale and the 
(dis)  economies of scope. The efficiency of alternative production plans and the 
economies of scale have received considerable attention in the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) literature, cf. the references below. Less focus has been given to the 
economies of scope, an exception being Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994, Sec.10.4). 





With two products, this means that C(y1,y2) < C(y1, 0)+C(0, y2), where C(y1, y2) is the 
minimal costs of producing products 1 and 2 in the amounts y 1 and y 2. A key feature 
of most examples is the use of some sharable or quasi-public input in production, say a 
technological improvement which can be used in one area without affecting its use in 
another area. In this paper, we use the scope idea in a somewhat broader way. We do 
not require the merged units to initially produce different types of products, just 
different product mixes. To emphasize this, we shall talk about economy of harmony 
or mix. 
 
A related line of literature is concerned with estimating the potential gains from 
resource reallocations. An early paper combining this question with DEA models is 
Lewin and Morey (1981). They discuss the decomposition of inefficiency in a 
hierarchical organization into what can be attributed to inefficiencies in the production 
units with given resources and the misallocation of resources among the units at 
different levels of the organization. A recent contribution is Bännlund, Chung, Färe and 
Grosskopf(1998). They estimate the potential gains from allowing certain inputs 
(pollution permits) to be traded among the firms of an industry. This is done by 
comparing the profit under an existing distribution of the permits to the profit that is 
possible when pollution permits can be reallocated. Our approach is related to this 
approach, except that we do not have a single relevant output like profit (and therefore 
use Farrell type proportional changes to capture gains). Additionally, we distinguish the 
gains associated with reallocation among similarly sized firms, called the harmony 
effect below, and the gains that are available by changing the scale of the firms, called 
the size effect below. 
 
Kao and Yang(1989) use a DEA model to analyze the reorganization of the national 
forest districts in Taiwan. The need for fewer and larger districts gives rise to four 
alternative district-plans. The new districts are merged from the  old ones, and the 
expected performance of the new districts are evaluated by comparing the aggregation 
of the constituent districts to a district production model based on the original ones. 
This is similar to the approach we use here to measure the overall potential gain from a 
merger. The aim is different, however, since Kao and Yang(1989) seek districts that 
are similar in terms of efficiency. They do so to provide a fair basis for subsequent 
competition and comparison, and they do not consider alternative ways of 
accomplishing this. (See Bogetoft(1997) for some similar design considerations in a 
formal agency setting involving DEA.) W e seek a reorganization that maximizes the 
potential gains and we consider alternative ways to accomplish this ranging from 
learning from peer units to genuine mergers. 
 
Our approach is also related to the notion of the structural efficiency of an industry. 
According to Farrell(1957,p.262) structural efficiency is "the extent to which an 
industry keeps up with the performance of its own best firms" and it can be measured 
by comparing the horizontal aggregation of the industry's firms with the frontier 
constructed from its individual firms. This is similar to the way we measure the 
aggregate gain from a merger. A related approach is the average unit approach 
suggested by Försund and Hjalmarsson(1979). In this approach, the structural 
efficiency is estimated b y taking the average of each type of input and each type of 
output and by measuring the associated average unit's distance to the frontier. This is 





that we correct for individual inefficiencies first. 
 
It is relevant to observe - as does Farrell(1957,p.261) - that the structural efficiency 
generally falls short of the average individual efficiency. The reason is the "curvature" 
of the frontier or more precisely the convexity of the production possibility set. We 
shall emphasize this below. Here, we just note  that  this is not a problem in our 
estimation of the potential gains from a merger. In fact, it is precisely the ability of an 
average unit to save more inputs or produce more outputs that we consider to be an 
important source of gains from a merger, which we then call the harmony effect. 
Caution is called for, however, in ex post studies. Often the cost aspects of a merger is 
evaluated by comparing the average pre-merger efficiency with the post-merger 
efficiency of the new unit, cf. e.g. Akhaven, Berger and Humphrey(1997), Chapin and 
Schmidt(1999) and the references herein. In this case the positive effects of a merger 
may well be underestimated simply because the target for the merged unit is more 
demanding than the targets for its constituent parts. Put differently, even though this 
measure indicates increased slack, the merger may be advantageous from the point of 
view of production economics. Our harmony index emphasizes this.  
 
Lastly, we note that there are technical resemblances between the merger issue and the 
role of aggregation in production theory. There is a large literature on the aggregation 
of variables and the separability of production processes. There are also a few papers 
explicitly linking these issues to the efficiency measurement problem, cf. Färe and 
Lovell(1988). Such studies may give conditions on the technology under which the 
different merger effects can be excluded, see also Bogetoft(1998b). We hope to 
pursues this issue in later research. 
 
It is clear that one cannot predict or prescribe mergers based solely on the potential 
market economic or production economic gains. Mergers involve several issues that 
are hard to capture in a formal model, including the similarity of the business cultures 
in the merged units. Subsequent to the application described below, several managers 
contacted us to discuss their merger possibilities. They consistently emphasized the 




3. Production Models 
 
 
Consider the case where each of n Decision Making Units (DMUs), i˛I={1, 2, …, n}, 
transforms p inputs to q outputs. Let x x x
i i
p
i = ( ,..., ) 1 ˛￿0
p be the inputs consumed and 
q i
q
i i y y y 0 1 ) ,..., ( ￿ ˛ =  the outputs produced in DMU






p q| x can produce y} 
 
and let x ﬁP(x) and y ﬁL(y) be the associated production and consumption 
correspondences 






Some regularity assumptions are usually imposed on  T.  Classical assumptions are that 
for all x¢, x† ˛￿0
p and y¢, y†˛￿0
q  we have 
 
A1 disposability:  (x¢,y¢)˛T and x†‡x¢ and y†£y¢ ￿  (x†,y†)˛T  
 
A2 convexity:    T convex 
 
A3 s-return to scale:  (x', y') ˛T  ￿  k(x', y')˛T for k˛K(s) 
 
where s = "crs", "drs", "vrs", or "irs" corresponding to constant, decreasing, varying 
or increasing return to scale, and where K(crs) = ￿0, K(drs) = [0,1], K(vrs) = {1}, 
and K(irs) = [1, +￿) respectively. A less common but very relevant assumption here is 
the replicability or (super) additivity assumption that for all x¢, x† ˛￿0
p and y¢, y†˛￿0
q  
 
A4 additivity:    (x¢,y¢)˛T and (x†,y†)˛T ￿ (x¢+x†,y¢+y†)˛T 
 
From an applied point of view, we believe that the  additivity assumption has 
advantages over the scaling and the convexity assumptions typically adhered to in 
microeconomic textbooks. The appeal of the additivity assumption is straightforward. 
If one DMU produces y' using x' and another produces y" using x", a unit with inputs 
x'+x" should be able to produce at least y'+y", since it can simply operate as two 
independent divisions imitating the original ones. The convexity assumption lacks this 
"peer group" or "proved by way of examples" rationale. A convex combination is an 
addition of potentially artificial units derived by down-scaling feasible ones. 
 
Given a technology, efficiency has to do with the ability to reduce inputs without 
affecting outputs or to increase outputs without requiring more inputs. In the case of 
multiple inputs and outputs, the efficiency of a DMU, say DMU
i, is often measured by 
the so-called Farrell(1957) measures 
 
E
i = Min{E˛￿0 Œ(Ex
i , y
i)˛T}   or    F





i is the maximal contraction of all inputs and F
i is the maximal expansion of all 
outputs that are feasible in T. 
 
In many applications, the underlying production possibility set T is unknown. The Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach can be used to model and evaluate productive 
units in such cases. For a text-book introduction to DEA, see Charnes, Cooper, Lewin 
and Seiford (1994). Assuming that  x x x
i i
p
i = ( ,..., ) 1 ˛￿0




i i y y y 0 1 ) ,..., ( ￿ ˛ =  are the outputs actually produced in DMU
i, i˛I, the 
DEA approaches estimate T from the observed data points and evaluate the observed 
productions relative to the estimated technology. 
 
The estimate of T, the empirical reference technology T* with correspondences P*(.) 
and L*(.), is constructed according to the minimal extrapolation principle: T* is the 
smallest subset of  ￿
+
0
p q that contains the actual production plans (x
i,y





satisfies certain technological assumptions specific to the given approach. 
 
The (relative) e fficiency of DMU
i may then be measured in input or output space by 
using the Farrell-measures above with T* substituted for T. 
 
Different DEA models invoke different assumptions about the technology. The original 
constant returns to scale (crs) DEA model proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 
(1978, 1979) assumes A1, A2 and A3(crs) while the decreasing returns to scale (drs) 
and (local) variable  returns to scale (vrs) models developed by Banker (1984) and 
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) appeal to A1, A2 a nd A3(drs) and A1, A2 and 
A3(vrs), respectively. It is easy to see, cf. e.g. the references above, that A1, A2 and 
A3(s) lead to the empirical reference technology 
 
T*(s) ={(x, y) ˛￿
+
0
p q |$l ˛￿0
n:x ‡ ￿i l
ix




where L(crs) = ￿0
n , L(drs) = {l˛￿0
n | ￿i l
i £ 1} and L(vrs) = {l˛￿0
n |   ￿i l
i = 1}. 
 
The assumptions A1-A3 have been relaxed in the free  disposability hull (fdh) model 
used by Deprins, Simar and Tulkens (1984), and the free replicability hull (frh) model 
briefly proposed in Tulkens(1993). The fdh model invokes only A1 and T*(fdh) 
therefore has the structure above with L(fdh) = {l˛￿0
n |   ￿i l
i = 1, l
i ˛{0, 1} "i}. 
The frh model presumes A1 and the additivity assumption A4 such that T*(frh) has the 
structure above with L(frh)={ l˛￿0
n | l
i integer "i}. DEA models partially relaxing 
the convexity assumptions are suggested in Bogetoft (1996) and Petersen (1990). 
 
We note that DEA provides an inner approximation of the underlying production 
possibility set. The efficiency estimates are therefore optimistic and the potentials input 
savings and output expansions a re underestimated. This applies also to the merger 
gains we shall estimate below. They are in general downwards biased. When we 
decompose the gains to identify alternative ways to capture the gains, the bias persist, 
but since it affects all estimates, the relative attractiveness of the different 
organizational remedies are not systematically affected - except perhaps for a particular 




4. Measures of Potential Merger Gains 
 
Let us assume that it makes "organizational sense" to merge the J -DMUs, i.e. the 
DMUs with indexes j ˛ J ˝{1, 2, ..., n}. In our application we merge DMUs that are 
close in a geographic sense since here proximity to customers is crucial. In other 
cases, it may be of greater importance to have the same owners or to have similar 
organizational cultures in order for a merger to be meaningful. 
 
The merged unit is denoted DMU
J. Direct pooling of the inputs and outputs gives a unit 
which has used  ￿j˛J x
j to produce ￿j˛J y
j. This corresponds to having a completely 






A radial input based measure of the potential overall gains from merging the J-DMUs 
is therefore 
 
 (P1)  E
J = Min{E˛￿0 Œ( E[￿j˛J x
j], ￿j˛J y
j ) ˛T} 
 
E
J is the maximal proportional reduction in the aggregated inputs ￿j˛J x
j that allows the 
production of the aggregated output profile ￿j˛J y
j. If E
J <1, we can save by merging. 
If E
J >1, the merger is costly. 
 
Similarly, an output based measure of the potential overall gains from merging the J -
DMUs could be 
   
(P2)   F
J = Max {F˛￿0 ￿( ￿j˛J x
j, F[￿j˛J y
j] )˛T} 
     
F
J is the maximal proportional expansion of the aggregate output ￿j˛J y
j that is feasible 
in a (merged) unit with aggregate input ￿j˛J x
j. If F
J >1, we can gain by merging. If F
J 
<1, the merger is costly. 
 
If we insert a DEA estimate of the production possibility set we get the following 
operational measures of the potential merger gains 
 
    Min  E
J           
  (P3)    E
J, l 
      s.t.  E
J[￿j˛J x
j]   ‡  ￿i˛I l
ix
i   
            [￿j˛J y
j]  £      ￿i˛I l
iy
i   





    Max  F
J                 
(P4)   F
J, l 
    s.t.     [￿j˛J x
j]   ‡      ￿i˛I l
ix
i     
      F
J[￿j˛J y
j]   £      ￿i˛I l
iy
i     
       l˛L(k)               
 
We observe that neither of these programs may have feasible solutions. In such cases 
we define E
J = + ￿ and F
J  =  -￿, respectively. Intuitively, the programs may be 
infeasible for two reasons. Firstly, the merged unit may be large and the return to scale 
properties may not favor large units. This may be the case in the drs, vrs and fdh 
model. Secondly, the merged unit may involve an input mix that is not very "powerful" 
or an output mix that is "hard" to produce. This may be the case in the fdh model. We 
shall return to the scaling and mixture effects of mergers in greater detail below. 
 
A general sufficient condition for the merger to be (weakly) advantageous is that the 
technology satisfies the J-additivity condition 
 






In such cases it is possible to produce ￿j˛Jy
j using ￿j˛Jx
j given that it was possible to 
produce y
j using x
j, j˛J.  
 
We note that the J -additivity condition  ￿j˛J T  ˝ T is equivalent to  either of the 
conditions 
 
    ￿j˛JL(y'
j) ˝ L(￿j˛Jy'
j)   
 






j)˛T, j˛J. A sufficient condition for the merger of the J-DMUs to be 





Since merger advantages are often expressed in cost terms, we further note that the 
first of these conditions implies subadditivity of the cost function C(y,w) = Min{wx | 
x˛L(y)} for all possible input prices w˛￿0
p  
     
    ￿j˛J C(y'
j,w) ‡ C(￿j˛J y'
j,w)     
 
and that the latter implies superadditivity of the revenue function R(x,p) = Max{py | 
y˛P(x)} for all possible output prices p˛￿0
q  
 
    ￿j˛JR(x'
j,p) £ R(￿j˛Jx'
j,p)     
 
Under convexity assumptions, we have by duality theory that the latter conditions are 
in fact equivalent to the former, c.f. also Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell(1994,ch.10.4.) 
 
So far, we have discussed J-additivity (or in convex cases, cost subadditivity) as a 
means of avoiding merger programs (P1) and (P2) with no feasible solutions. It suffices 
to ensure, however, not only that the programs have finite solutions, but that E
J £ 1 
and F
J ‡1, i.e. that we get weak gains as opposed to losses from mergers. Moreover, if 
we require weak gains for arbitrary mergers, the additivity condition is not only 
sufficient, it is a necessary condition as well. The latter only requires a free 
disposability assumption. We record these observations as a proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 
Consider a technology satisfying free disposability A1. We then have 
•  Additivity A4 is a necessary and sufficient condition for (P1) and (P2) to have 
(feasible) solutions with E
J £ 1 and F
J ‡1 for arbitrary mergers. The crs and frh 
technologies satisfy these conditions.  
•  For convex technologies, subadditive cost functions and superadditive revenue 
functions are necessary and sufficient conditions to have (feasible solutions) 
with E
J £ 1 and F









We first show sufficiency of A4. By induction, the additivity assumption A4 
implies the J -additivity assumption  ￿j˛J T  ˝ T. Therefore, when it is possible to 
produce y
j using x
j, j˛J, it is also possible to produce ￿j˛Jy
j using ￿j˛Jx
j . This implies 
E
J £ 1 and F
J ‡1 and in particular that we get feasible solutions to (P1) and (P2).  
We next show the necessity of A4. Let (x
1,y
1 ) and (x
2,y
2 ) be arbitrary points 
in T. By assumption, the merger programs now give E
J £ 1 and F
J ‡1 for J={1,2}. 
















2) in T. Therefore, T is additive. 
The crs model is a free disposable  A1 model and it is additive A4, since it 
satisfies A2 and A3(crs) which implies A4. (Indeed, the crs model can alternatively be 
defined by A1, A3(crs) and A4). The frh is defined by A1 and A4 directly. 
The second bullet in the proposition follows by the equivalence under convexity 
of additivity in the technology and subadditivity (superadditivity) of the costs (revenue) 
functions. Combining with the first part of the proposition, we now get the second 
part. 
 Q.E.D.   
 
We note that the free-disposability assumption is not needed for the sufficiency parts, 
only for the necessity proofs. Moreover, weak free disposability in the sense that (x, y) 
˛T  ￿  (ax, y)˛T for a ‡1 and (x, y) ˛T  ￿  (x, by)˛T for b £1 will do. For 




5. Decomposing Merger Gains 
 
 
Our measures of the potential overall merger gains, E
J and F
J, encompass several 
effects. In this section, we decompose the overall effect into technical efficiency, scale 
and mix effects and we discuss the organizational relevance of this decomposition. 
 
Some or all of the units in J may be technically inefficient and this may be captured in 
E
J and F
J. A merger may bring in new management which may facilitate the elimination 
of such inefficiencies. However, it is also possible to reduce technical inefficiencies 
through other means, e.g. by imitating the better performers, sometimes referred to as 
the peer units. To avoid compounding the effects, therefore, it is useful to adjust the 
overall merger gains for the technical efficiency effect. To do so, we can project the 
original units to the production possibility frontier and use the projected plans as the 
basis for evaluating the remaining gains from the merger. 
 





j) for all j˛J, where E
j =E
{j} is the 
standard efficiency score for the single DMU




j˛J, as the basis for calculating the adjusted overall gains from the merger 
 
(P5)   E
*J = Min{E˛￿0 Œ( E[￿j˛JE
jx
j], ￿j˛J y
j ) ˛T} 
 
The output based measure F





ourselves to input based measures from hereon. 
 
If we insert a DEA estimate of the production possibility set, we get the following 




    Min  E         
      E,l 
      s.t.  E [￿j˛JE
jx
j ] ‡  ￿i˛I l
ix
i   
            [￿j˛J y
j]   £      ￿i˛I l
iy
i   





*J we get 
 






J˛[0,1] indicates what can be saved by individual adjustments in the different 
units in J. 
 
Since the individual units can be projected to the frontier in many ways, there are many 
possibilities to construct merger measures that are adjusted for technical inefficiencies 
at the individual level. In the E
*J program (P5), we could for example use output based 
projections of the individual units instead of the input based projections, we could 
supplement the proportional reductions with non-proportional slack adjustments, or we 
could introduce non-radial projections. 
 
Assuming that individual technical inefficiencies have been dealt with, we are left with 
the two most interesting production economic effects of a merger. 
 
One is the scaling or size effect. A merger leads to a unit that operates at a large scale. 
This may or may not be advantageous, depending on the scale properties of the 


















irs frontier  
An irs technology: 
Input saving = (1-E)(x
1+x
2) 




















        Figure 1.  The Size Effect of Merging  
 
The other main effect of a merger is that it leads to other input and output mixes. This 
may be advantageous by taking us into more "productive" directions of the product 
space. We shall refer to this as the  harmony, scope  or  mixture effects. Figure 2 















         
        Figure 2.  The Harmony Effect of Merging 
 
Without further assumptions about the technology, we cannot put signs on the size and 
the harmony effects. We have already illustrated cases where t hey are positive. 
Negative size and harmony effects are illustrated in Figure 3. A case of opposing 
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A crs technology: 
Input saving = (1-E)(x
1+x
2) 





A drs technology: 
Input cost = (E-1)(x
1+x
2) 










A crs technology: 
Input cost = (E-1)( x
1+x
2) 














  3a. Size Effect            3b. Harmony Effect 
 
      Figure 3.  Negative Size and Harmony Effects 
 
 
We note that both the size and harmony effects are reflected in the additivity condition 
￿j˛J T  ˝ T, or equivalently, the conditions  ￿j˛JP(x
j)  ˝ P(￿j˛Jx
j) or  ￿j˛JL(y
j)  ˝ 
L(￿j˛Jy
j). Positive size effects correspond to strict inclusions with proportional input 
(or output) profiles, while positive mixture effects corresponds to strict inclusions with 
input (or output) profiles pointing in different directions. 
 
In Figures 1 -3, it was easy to d istinguish the size and harmony effects, since we 
assumed constant return to scale (leaving no room for size effects) when we illustrated 
the harmony effect and we assumed a single input single output technology (leaving no 
room for harmony effects), when we illustrated the size effects. In general, however, 
it is less obvious how to distinguish the two effects. We shall return to some of the 
ambiguities below. First, however, we outline a decomposition which we find natural 
and useful. 
 
We propose to capture the  harmony gains by examining how much of the average 
input could have been saved in the production of the average output, i.e. by the 
measure H
J 
           
(P6)   H





j ) ˛T} 
 
where |J| is the number of elements in J. We look at the average input and average 
output, since we do not want the expansion of size to come into play yet. Using the 
average is most relevant if the units in J are not too different in size to begin with. If 
the sizes differ considerably, we may be picking up scale effects, e.g. if some units are 
larger than and some are smaller than the " most productive scale size" as defined by 
Banker(1984). Note that H
J<1 indicates a savings potential due to improved harmony, 
while H
J >1 indicates a cost of harmonizing the inputs and outputs. 
 
As previously, we may insert a DEA estimate of the production possibility set and 
hereby get an operational linear programming measure of the potential harmony gains 
 
    Min  H           
      H, l 
      s.t.  H[|J|
-1￿j˛JE
jx
j]  ‡  ￿i˛I l
ix
i   
           [|J|
-1￿j˛Jy

































       l˛L(k)       
 
Next, we capture the  size gains by asking how much could have been saved by 
operating at full scale rather than average scale, i.e. by the measure S
J 
       
(P7)   S




j ) ˛T} 
 
The re-scaling is advantageous, S
J <1, if we have economies of scale, and costly, S
J 
>1, if the return to scale property does not favor larger units. 
 
The corresponding DEA based operational measure of the size gains is  
 
 
    Min  S           
      S, l 
      s.t.  S[H
J ￿j˛JE
jx
j]   ‡  ￿i˛I l
ix
i   
           ￿j˛Jy
j        £     ￿i˛I l
iy
i   
       l˛L(k)       
 
Using these definitions, we have 
 
    E
*J = H
J * S





*J we get our basic decomposition 
 




J           
 
This corresponds to a decomposition of the basic merger index E
J into a technical 
efficiency index T
J, a harmony index H
J and a size index S
J. The technical efficiency 
measure T
J captures what can be gained by making the individual units efficient. The 
remaining potentials to save, E
*J, are created by the harmony effect, H




Figure 4 below illustrates the decomposition in a case with positive harmony effect and 



























2  L(2y) 
A drs technology: 
Harmony saving = (1-H)(x
1+x
2) > 0 
Scale saving = (H-H*S)(x
1+x
2) < 0 
Net saving = (1-E)(x
1+x




















The decomposition of the potential gains from merging DMUs into a technical 
efficiency measure, a harmony measure and a size measure is important because full 
scale mergers are typically not the only organizational option available and it may be 
that alternative organizational changes may be easier to implement. In particular, we 
suggest that the following may guide the organizational restructuring: 
 
Low technical efficiency measure T
J: 
One could let the inefficient DMUs learn from the practices and procedures of the 
more efficient ones. If the problem is not a lack of skills but rather motivation, one 
could improve the incentives, e.g. by using relative performance evaluation and 
yardstick competition based on the technical efficiency measures, cf. 
Bogetoft(1994,95,97,2000). Of course, if the problem is scarcity of management 
talent, it may still be necessary to make a genuine merger to transfer control to the 
more efficient administrative teams and hereby improve the managerial efficiency (X-
efficiency). 
  
Low harmony measure H
J: 
One could consider reallocating the inputs and outputs among the DMUs to create 
more "powerful" input mixes and more easily produced output mixes. This can be done 
a) inside a hierarchy, b) by long term contracts or perhaps c) by creating a market for 
key inputs and outputs, cf. also Brännlund, Chung, Färe and Grosskopf(1998). In the 
next section, we will formalize the relationship between the harmony measure and the 
reallocation problem.  
 
Low size measure S
J: 
In this case, full scale mergers may be the only alternative. If we need large amounts 
of fixed capital, highly specialized staff, long run-lengths or simply a critical mass to 
obtain sufficient returns from scale, it may be relevant to merge. Also, and perhaps 
most importantly, this may be relevant if the reallocation through contracts or a market 
are associated with too many transaction costs to make it attractive, cf. the general 


















6. Alternative Decompositions 
 
 
The decomposition developed above gives only one - natural we believe - way to define 
and distinguish between technical efficiency, the size and the harmony effects. 
 
A similar decomposition is possible in the output space, but it will not in general lead to 
the same quantitative measures of the different effects. 
 
Also, there is typically some possibility of substituting between the harmony and size 
effects. To show this, consider the following modified definition of the harmony effect 
           
(P8)   Ha
J  =  Min{H˛￿0 Œ( H[a￿j˛JE
jx
j], a￿j˛Jy
j ) ˛T} 
 
where  a ˛ [0,1] is a scalar that defines the activity level at which we calculate the 
harmony gains. Above, we used a=|J|
-1, i.e. we used a simple mean size to determine 
the harmony gains. We could still define the size effects as in (P 6) except that we 
should use H a
J instead of H
J. Now, by varying a, we get different values for the 
harmony and size effects. It is straightforward to prove the following simple lemma. 
 
Lemma 1 H a
J is independent of, weakly increasing in, weakly decreasing in or non-
monotonic in a ˛ [0,1] when T is a constant return to scale (crs), decreasing return to 
scale (drs), increasing return to scale (irs) or varying return to scale (vrs) technology. 
 









j ) ˛T for a' ˛￿0 when T is a 
crs technology, for all a' ˛ [0, a] when T is drs technology, and for all a' ˛ [a,+￿) 
when T is a irs technology, respectively. This implies that H a
J decreases when a 
reduces in a drs technology and that H a
J decreases when  a increases in a n irs 
technology. In the crs case, it shows that H a
J weakly decreases when a varies and, 
since this holds for arbitrary a, it implies that H a
J is constant. In a vrs technology, we 
get a non-monotonic H a
J. For small values, it decreases, then it is constant and than it 
increases in a ˛ [0,1]. The constancy occurs when (a￿j˛JE
jx
j, a￿j˛Jy
j ) is projected 
into a most productive scale size plan, cf. Banker(1984).  Cases where the program 
may not be feasible follows similarly. 
   Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma  1 emphasizes the possibility  of making a lternative decompositions,  i.e. it 
emphasizes the indefiniteness of the decomposition. If we choose a low value of a in a 
drs technology, we assign some size effect to the harmony component. In the irs case, 
a low value of a would lead us to assign some of the harmony effect to the size 
component. We leave it to future research to determine more general technological 
properties that are necessary for the decomposition to be independent of a. 
 
It is worthwhile also to compare our resulting size effect with the traditional measure 
of scale efficiency S
#(x,y) of some unit (x,y) 
S






where E(x,y;crs) is the unit’s Farrell based input measure assuming constant return to 
scale and  E(x,y;vrs) is the Farrell based measure assuming variable return to scale. 
The traditional interpretation is that the underlying technology is infact a vrs 
technology, and that the scale efficiency therefore measures the loss from  not 
operating at the most productive scale size, cf. e.g. Banker(1984) and B anker, Charnes 
and Cooper(1984). This measure basically assumes that it is possible to adopt optimal 
scale size under vrs and it measures the losses from not adapting hereto. We could of 

















j ; crs) / E(￿j˛JE
jx
j, ￿j˛Jy
j ; vrs) 
 
This would in most cases give results that differ from the harmony and size measure s 
we propose. The alternative harmony effect would be larger, i.e. H
# would be smaller, 
as the technology we use to evaluate H
# would be larger. 
 
The difficulty with this alternative approach, however, is that the size effect is hard to 
interpret. If the merged unit is below most productive scale size, cf. Banker(1984), the 
scale effect would be what can be gained by increasing the size of the unit. However, 
this is not possible as we have already included all units. If the merged unit is above 
most productive scale size, the scale measure would capture what can be gained by 
reducing the size of the merged unit. However, this is not possible when we are only 
considering a given merger. The scale effect S
# would therefore ignore the underlying 
problem of matching the inputs and outputs of a given set of units. The measure would 
implicitly presume that it is possible to adapt via a market or via a large set of units. 
(Similar caveats on the interpretation of scale efficiency can be raised in many 




The introduction of  modified harmony indexes is only one way to vary the 
decomposition. A more fundamental alteration would be to calculate harmony and 
scaling effects without presuming technical efficiency. Organizationally, this may be 
very relevant since it may be easier to reallocate resources than to change the internal 
culture, tradition and routines and hereby the technical efficiency. The difficulty of 
such a  reversed decomposition is that the rates of substitution needed to evaluate the 
size and harmony gains, are only well defined on the frontier. Still, by making proper 
assumptions about the technology, methodologically sound "off-the-frontier-
reallocation-gains" may be calculated. Some initial work along these lines is reported in 
Bogetoft and Färe(1999). 
 
We close this discussion of alternative ways to decompose the overall gains by taking a 
closer look at the harmony measure H  in cases of convex, free disposable 
technologies. This also supports the o rganizational interpretations of H that we have 






Consider what can be saved – after individual learning - by mere reallocations of inputs 
and outputs, of resources and obligations, among the units in J. Let the new input and 
output combinations after reallocation be (x*
j
, y*
j) for j˛J. If we measure the saving 
potential in proportion to best practice usage, the savings from pure reallocations can 
be determined by solving the following pure reallocation problem: 
 
           
(P8)    h
J  =  Min   h 
      h, (x*
j
, y*
j), j˛J  
      s.t   h
J[￿j˛JE
jx
j]    ‡ ￿j˛Jx*
j, 
          ￿j˛Jy
j    £  ￿j˛Jy*
j 
              (x*
j
, y*
j) ˛T all j˛J 
               h˛￿0 
 




j) for j˛J. The constraints are that we must have enough 
inputs to produce at least the old aggregate output and that all production plans after 
reallocation must be feasible in T. 
 




If T is free disposable and convex, A1 and A2, we have that H
J=h
J, i.e. the 
harmony index captures what can be gained by pure reallocations. 
 
Proof: 
The proof first shows H
J ‡ h




To show that H
J ‡ h










j ), k˛J 
 
By the definition of H
J, we have 
(x*
k,y*







so the first constraint in the h-program is fulfilled for h‡H. The second constraint is 
fulfilled because  
￿j˛Jy*




In summary, we have found a feasible solution to the h program and we can conclude 
that h
J £ H
J as desired. 
 
We will now show that H
J £ h
J. Consider an arbitrary solution (x*
k,y*
k) k˛J to the h
J 
program. By definition of h
J we have 
 
          h
J [￿j˛JE
jx
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j  £ ￿j˛Jy*
j 
          (x*
j
, y*
j) ˛T all j˛J 
 
It follows that 
 




j]  ‡ |J|
-1￿j˛Jx*
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j) ˛T  
 
where the last inclusion is a consequence of (x*
j
, y*
j) ˛T all j˛J and T being convex. 






j) ˛T. Using the 
definition of H
J, H





j ) ˛T}, we hereby get H
J 
£ h
J as desired. 
   Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proposition 2 gives a rationale for defining the mix effect as H. Also, it formalizes the 
interpretation of H as what can be gained by pure reallocation among the units in J. 
This also gives a rationale for our organizational interpretations and recommendations 
from the last section. A low H  shows that there are large potentials to gain from pure 
reallocation among the units – a genuine merger is not necessary. 
 
Note that H is a  measure of allocative inefficiency that is derived in an “incomplete 
market”. There are no given prices and  only a few agents between which the 
reallocations most take place and be balanced. In contrast, the traditional production 
economic notion of allocative efficiency, i.e. the ratio of cost efficiency to technical 
efficiency, presumes that market prices are given and hereby that the input choice of 
any given unit can take place without being concerned about the wider market effects.  
  
 
7. The Danish Agricultural Extension Services 
 
In Denmark, agricultural advisory services are provided by 71 extension offices. (Two 
of these offices, numbered 52 and 47, actually share advisors, and they are therefore 
treated as one, numbered office 47, in this study.) These offices serve different 
geographical regions. The offices a re co-operatives owned by the farmers in the 
corresponding regions. The regions have a long tradition of cooperation. The regional 
organizations are part of a national organization which operates a supra -advisory 
office, The National Agricultural Advisory Centre at Skejby, from which the local 
offices can buy standardized computer-programs, expert-help, etc. 
 
In this section, we are going to evaluate these offices. We expect to find high relative 
efficiency levels because of the similarity of the technologies and the widespread 
cooperation of the offices. At the same time, we expect potential gains from mergers, 
in particular from the harmony effect. The reason being that the farmers' demand for 
extension services may change relatively fast due to new market conditions and 
environmental regulations while the qualifications and structures of the extension 






The data for this study includes a rather detailed description of all the activities in the 
economic sections of the 71 offices in the year Oct. 1994-Sept. 1995. Due to 
confidentiality clauses, we cannot reveal the names or location of these offices. For the 
purpose of this analysis, we have aggregated the information into a description of the 
production process in terms of 4 inputs and 4 outputs, namely 
 
Inputs: 
HELABOR: Number of employees with higher education (academics) 
LELABOR: Number of employees with lower education (technicians etc) 
EDB:     Computation costs 
BUILDCOST:  Office rent and other costs 
 
Outputs: 
ECOACC:    Number of external accounts (financial statements) produced 
PRODACC:  Number of internal accounts produced 
BUDGETACC:  Number of budgets produced 
TOTOACC:  Number of other services produced, e.g. subsidy applications 
 
We note that the data does not capture the ultimate extension output, namely improved 
farm performance. The National Agricultural Advisory Centre is presently developing 
quality measurement techniques that could improve the output description used here.  
 
Summary statistics for the 4 inputs and 4 outputs are provided in Table 1 below. In the 
















Table 1. Summary statistics of the 70 advisory offices         
                   
                   
Labor size  No.  econacc  prodacc  budgacc  totoacc  helabor  lelabor  EDB  Buildcost 
    (acc. No.)  (acc. No.)  (acc. No.)  (acc. No.)  (full-time)  (full-time)  (100 kr)  (100 kr) 
                   
         averages in groups       
                   





10,00-19,99  27  431,70  240,33  67,85  165,63  5,75  9,73  4089,98  9239,44 
20,00-29,99  16  660,44  362,94  107,13  266,31  10,28  14,08  6631,51  14813,25 
30,00-39,99  10  807,20  456,50  128,90  364,00  12,40  19,98  8309,37  17227,83 
40,00-49,99  2  1064,50  576,00  165,50  437,00  13,80  28,66  7431,58  17822,79 
50,00-59,99  6  1235,67  520,33  166,83  576,83  17,60  39,42  9618,38  28314,19 
>60,00  2  1635,50  836,50  314,50  1182,00  27,75  44,55  19585,24  41861,53 
                   
Total  70  44428,00  23337,00  7023,00  19623,00  646,79  1101,24  425005,93  973049,17 
Average  -  634,69  333,39  100,33  280,33  9,24  15,73  6071,51  13900,70 
Min  -  76,00  19,00  19,00  10,00  1,00  2,50  1189,85  1200,73 
Max  -  1760,00  923,00  401,00  1216,00  31,00  49,60  20707,88  48189,33 
STDEV  -  351,66  190,95  61,91  234,57  5,84  10,83  3560,40  9053,47 




To investigate the efficiency of the individual offices, we initially calculated input based 
DEA scores for each of them. The efficiency distributions in both the crs and the vrs 
technologies are reported in Figure 5 below.  
Figure 5a E
j Efficiency Distribution of 70 Offices






















































j Efficiency Distribution of 70 Offices 





















































We see that if the technology is modeled using a constant return to scale DEA model, 
the estimated average saving is 8.75%. In the varying return to scale model, the 
average saving potential is 5.02%. Informal comparison with other DEA based 
productivity studies show that these numbers are in no way extreme - given the 
number of DMUs and the number of inputs and outputs.  
 
Many of the offices are located close to each other and a lot of the services are 
delivered via phone and computers. For the purpose of considering potential mergers, 
we have therefore examined what potentially could be saved by merging offices 
located within a driving distance of 50 kilometers (approximate 30 miles) from each 
other. This leads to a total of 458 possible mergers involving two or three offices. We 
have tested the merger gains from all of these combinations using both crs and vrs 
DEA-models as the basic production model. The distribution of the merger gains are 
reported in Table 2 below, where we have left out the cases with no potential gains. 
 
Table 2 shows that there are considerable potential gains from merging. Assuming a 
crs technology and assuming that we have first corrected for individual inefficiencies, 
we see that 409 of the possible 458 E
*J scores was less than 1. Furthermore, about 100 
of these mergers generate a saving which is of approximately the same size, 8 -10 %, 
as the average gains from the  individual improvements reported above. Under a vrs 
technology, the gains from merging (as the gains from individual improvements) are 













Table 2. Distribution of merger efficiency measures (<100%) under CRS and 
VRS 
             
Efficiency                        CRS technology                               VRS technology 
interval in %           E
J          E*
J               E
J          E*
J 
             
55,00-59,99  2  0      0  0 
60,00-64,99  2  0      0  0 
65,00-69,99  1  0      0  0 
70,00-74,99  19  0      2  0 
75,00-79,99  50  4      0  0 
80,00-84,99  112  14      13  1 
85,00-89,99  118  23      15  3 
90,00-94,99  83  96      29  12 
95,00-99,99  36  272      30  25 
             
Total  423  409      89  41 
             




To further examine the most promising mergers, Table 3 list the 25 mergers leading to 
the lowest E
J scores under the crs assumption. Again, this illustrates that there are non-
trivial potential gains from mergers in the Danish extension sector.  
 
Finally, we list the 25 most promising mergers in a vrs technology in Table 4. In this 
case, the decompositions of the total gains also show that there is generally quite a bit 
to be gained in terms of the harmony effects. The size effect, however, generally 
works against the mergers. Only in the merger of the rather small offices 56 and 65, 
code A10, do we get a positive size effect. 
 
We note that the negative size effect may be caused by the estimation procedure more 
than the production economic realities. Since we have relatively few large units, the 
production norms for large units  - and hereby the estimated potential gains from 
creating such units via mergers - will be relatively small, due to a less precise estimate. 
In general, a smaller sample size - or a small sample size in a given region - leads to 
smaller production estimates when we use a minimal extrapolation estimation 
technique, cf. also Zhang and Bertels(1998). 
 
Again, however, these numbers illustrate that the gains from mergers can be 
significant. The A13 merger, for example, suggest a potential gain of 15.88% from a 
merger even though the individual units cannot be improved. This gain is the result of a 











Table 3. Merger efficiencies of the top 25 most promising mergers under CRS, in 
% 
       
         
Code  Merger           E
J           T
J        E*
J ( =H
J ) 
         
A1  Office 46 and 49  58,20  68,61  84,83 
A2  Office 46, 49 and 53  59,77  76,09  78,55 
A3  Office 46, 49 and 50  62,03  75,95  81,67 
A4  Office 46 and 53  62,87  79,44  79,14 
A5  Office 33, 34 and 35  68,32  82,93  82,38 
A6  Office 46, 49 and 51  70,05  79,87  87,71 
A7  Office 02 and 06  70,34  74,74  94,11 
A8  Office 46 and 47  71,37  84,13  84,83 
A9  Office 46, 47 and 50  71,73  84,66  84,73 
A10  Office 33, 37 and 39  71,84  88,75  80,95 
A11  Office 49 and 53  72,28  76,36  94,66 
A12  Office 68 and 71  72,30  73,45  98,43 
A13  Office 33 and 34  72,32  81,22  89,04 
A14  Office 46, 51 and 53  72,64  85,27  85,19 
A15  Office 46 and 50  72,93  81,50  89,48 
A16  Office 33 and 37  73,20  90,43  80,95 
A17  Office 33, 37 and 40  73,45  89,67  81,91 
A18  Office 33 and 35  73,49  91,16  80,62 
A19  Office 34, 35 and 44  73,58  84,08  87,51 
A20  Office 33, 37 and 44  74,09  91,20  81,24 
A21  Office 03 and 06  74,45  81,25  91,63 
A22  Office 04 and 06  74,76  77,14  96,92 
A23  Office 02, 03 and 06  74,93  80,91  92,61 
A24  Office 34 and 44  74,95  84,60  88,59 
A25  Office 33, 39 and 40  75,07  91,90  81,69 






Table 4. Merger efficiencies of the top 25 most promising mergers under VRS, 
in % 
 
         
             
Code  Merger combination           E
J            T
J             E*
J         H
J          S
J 
             
A1  Office 46 and 49  73,88  84,41  87,53  83,29  105,09 
A2  Office 68 and 71  74,59  75,42  98,90  97,72  101,21 
A3  Office 56 and 57  80,38  85,62  93,88  93,39  100,52 
A4  Office 57 and 71  81,07  76,87  105,46  99,58  105,90 
A5  Office 28 and 32  81,68  81,95  99,67  94,08  105,94 
A6  Office 57 and 68  82,13  83,35  98,54  96,73  101,87 
A7  Office 64 and 67  82,52  84,19  98,02  90,44  108,38 
A8  Office 12 and 31  82,61  91,97  89,82  87,27  102,92 
A9  Office 56 and 64  83,31  85,99  96,88  89,23  108,57 





A11  Office 12 and 32  83,95  88,52  94,84  94,55  100,31 
A12  Office 12 and 28  84,09  81,03  103,77  97,67  106,25 
A13  Office 47 and 48  84,13  100,00  84,12  82,70  101,72 
A14  Office 12, 31 and 32  84,35  92,99  90,71  87,10  104,14 
A15  Office 28 and 29  84,43  80,76  104,54  96,89  107,90 
A16  Office 28 and 31  85,00  87,26  97,41  91,86  106,04 
A17  Office 57, 68 and 71  85,10  78,48  108,43  97,54  111,16 
A18  Office 17 and 22  85,18  86,61  98,35  98,35  100,00 
A19  Office 59 and 64  85,84  82,44  104,13  96,60  107,80 
A20  Office 13 and 32  85,87  89,53  95,91  94,04  101,99 
A21  Office 46 and 53  86,33  92,77  93,06  78,92  117,92 
A22  Office 28, 31 and 32  86,39  88,90  97,18  88,74  109,51 
A23  Office 17 and 19  86,77  86,18  100,68  94,01  107,09 
A24  Office 22 and 23  87,42  93,16  93,84  89,18  105,23 
A25  Office 12 and 17  87,54  82,93  105,56  94,03  112,26 
             
 
 
Prior to the study period, there had been some re-organization of the advisory offices. 
Offices in several regions had in fact been merged. Subsequently, more offices have 
merged, including some of the combinations identified above. Since we cannot indicate 
the identity of the offices, we can also not reveal which offices have subsequently 
merged. 
  
Needless to say, the empirical analysis above is intended to be illustrative. In a larger 
empirical study, more attention should be devoted to the details of the underlying 
production model. 
 
It may for example be useful to include partial price information using assurance 
regions or similar, cf.  eg.  Charnes, Cooper, Lewin and  Seiford  (1994). In our 
application, limits on the salaries of academics (HELABOR) compared to technicians 
(LELABOR) could be relevant. Partial price information will effectively enlarge the 
production possibility set and hereby increase the overall gains from a merger as 
measured by E
J. However, it may also affect the relative contributions of technical 
efficiency, mix and scale effects and hereby the organizational diagnosis that one 
arrives at. 
 
Another aspect of the modeling that deserves attention in full scale applications is 
controllability, i.e. the question of what are discretionary and non-discretionary 
variables. We have assumed here that all resources and products can be reallocated but 
in reality, some reallocations are easier than others. In our application, it may, for 
example, be relatively easy to exchange tasks that do not require farm visits, while it 
may be more difficult to actually exchange personal. Of course, controllability is 
related to the time horizon. In a short run perspective, less inputs and outputs can be 
controlled and the savings potentials from reorganization will be reduced.  
 
For clarity of exposition, we have not covered such extensions of the basic ideas. We 
suggest however that numerous extensions will be straightforward given the large 
literature on alternative DEA models, and we leave the remaining extensions for future 







8. Final Remarks 
 
In this paper, we introduced simple non-parametric production models to compute the 
potential gains from merging Decision Making Units. We decomposed the gains into 
technical efficiency, size and harmony effects. A merger may force the units to 
perform more efficiently on an individual basis. It also affects the scale of o peration 
which may or may not be advantageous, depending on the return to scale properties. 
Finally, it affects the mix of inputs available and outputs demanded. A merged unit 
faces a more balanced or harmonic input and output profile, which is typically 
advantageous. 
 
The decomposition allows us to identify alternative means of improving performance. 
If the technical efficiency is low, gains are possible by learning the practices of peer 
units and by introducing incentive schemes to motivate efficiency. I f the harmony 
index is low, improvements are possible by re-allocating resources, either within a 
hierarchy or through an inter-unit market for inputs and outputs. If the size index is 
low, a genuine merger may be called for to enable the optimal specialization, run-
lengths etc. 
 
The methodology was illustrated by computing gains from merging neighboring 
advisory offices in Denmark. We showed that considerable production economic gains 
from mergers can be expected. In many cases, the gains from individual i mprovements 
and from improved harmony effects were of the same order of magnitude. 
 
There are numerous relevant extensions of the research reported here. 
 
On the theoretical side, it is relevant to consider alternative decompositions and to 
identify technological regularities that suffice to make the decompositions unique. More 
generally, it is important to study what organizational changes to introduce in a post-
productivity analysis and to discuss how the analysis could be tailored in the first place 
to support such changes, cf. also Bogetoft(2000). 
 
On the applied side, our framework is particularly relevant in those cases where it is 
important to keep a multiple input multiple output description of the production 
process. This may be the case quite generally since a merger probably requires the 
units to match and complement each other in several dimensions. One area of possible 
application is environmental regulation. Farms and forests are subject to an increasing 
number of environmental restrictions in most countries. In Scandinavia, such 
constraints are often referred to as harmony constraints, since they concern the 
balance or harmony between different u ses of the environment. The approach of this 
paper can be used to evaluate alternative designs of such restrictions, including the use 
of farm specific or tradable requirements. Further, it can be used to predict likely 
responses to such regulations. One way to meet the increasing number of constraints 
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